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"GOOD CAUSE": CALIFORNIA'S NEW
"EXCEPTION" TO THE AT-WILL EMPLOYMENT
DOCTRINE
I. INTRODUCTION
California Labor Code section 2922 provides that "[a]n
employment, having no specified term, may be terminated at
the will of either party on notice to the other."1 This absolute
power of both the employer and the employee to terminate
the at-will employment relationship at any time and for
whatever reason is founded on the contractual concept of mu-
tuality of obligation.' This concept was first applied in em-
ployment relationships by the United States Supreme Court
in Adair v. United States.' It was argued in Adair that an
employee could not be forced to stay in someone's employ
against his will as that would be an unconstitutional act of
slavery; the employee therefore had the right to terminate his
employment at will. Just as the employee could not be treated
as a "slave," neither could the employer; thus the Court held
that the right to terminate the employment relationship at-
will should be mutual and extend to the employer as well.
In the absence of a valid contract between the parties
controlling their conduct towards each other and fixing a
period of service, it cannot be . . . that an employer is
under any legal obligation, against his will, to retain an
employe [sic] in his personal service any more than an
employe [sic] can be compelled to remain in the personal
service of another.8
This concept of mutuality has been embodied in Califor-
nia Labor Code section 2922. Soon after the enactment of sec-
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1. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2922 (West 1971 & Supp. 1983).
2. Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 448, 168 Cal. Rptr.
722, 725 (1980).
3. 208 U.S. 161 (1908).
4. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1, provides that "[n]either slavery nor involun-
tary servitude, except as a punishment for crime .. . shall exist within the United
States.. .. "
5. 208 U.S. at 175-76.
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tion 2922, however, it became apparent to both the California
courts and legislature that the at-will doctrine, applied in its
purest form, could lead to inequitable results.6 Consequently,
three limitations on the at-will relationship have been created
through judicial and legislative action; the mere fact that a
contract is terminable at-will no longer confers upon the em-
ployer the absolute right to terminate his employees. Under
the first limitation, an employment relationship will not be
terminable at-will if the employment contract contains an ex-
press or implied condition to the contrary.' The second and
third limitations forbid an employer from discharging an em-
ployee for reasons which are contrary to a specific statutory
provisions or to public policy.0
Prior to 1980 and three California appellate court deci-
sions, there existed in this state only these three exceptions to
the at-will doctrine. Through the use of an implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing in contractual relationships,
however, the courts have recently fashioned a sweeping new
exception to the doctrine, and have attempted to impose a
"good cause" requirement for termination in at-will employ-
ment situations. The first of these three important decisions,
Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co.,10 only hinted at the possi-
bility of this fourth exception. In the later case of Cleary v.
American Airlines, Inc.," however, the court relied upon the
"good cause" requirement, in its judgment against the em-
ployer's at-will termination of the employee. In the most re-
cent case, Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc.,"2 the court of appeal
again recognized the possible existence of the new "good
6. Such inequitable results could arise, for example, through employer coercion.
If the employer could fire the employee for any reason, then the employer could force
the employee to do anything he pleased, even to commit a crime, by using the threat
of discharge. Blades, Employment At Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the
Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 1404, 1408 (1967).
7. Drzewiecki v. H & R Block, Inc., 24 Cal. App. 3d 695, 101 Cal. Rptr. 169
(1972) (the employee could not be discharged unless he failed to properly conduct the
business).
8. Patterson v. Philco Corp., 252 Cal. App. 2d 63, 60 Cal. Rptr. 110 (1967); Ma-
rin v. Jacuzzi, 224 Cal. App. 2d 549, 36 Cal. Rptr. 880 (1964).
9. Petermann v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344
P.2d 25 (1959) (against public policy to discharge an employee for his refusal to com-
mit a crime).
10. 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980).
11. 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980).
12. 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1981).
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cause" exception which had been formally announced by the
Cleary court, but nevertheless declined to apply it, having
found its decision against the employer already supported by
the existing contractual exception.
Never before have the California courts limited an em-
ployer's power to terminate at-will employees without some
compelling public policy or statutory or contractual considera-
tion. While these three recent cases do not conclusively hold
that this "good cause" exception exists such that an employer
would not be able to terminate any employment relationship
without good cause, the courts' language clearly suggests that
future judicial decisions may in fact so hold. If accepted by
the California Supreme Court as precedent in California, this
new exception will effectively repeal Labor Code section 2922
and impose a "good cause" standard on the employer's tradi-
tional freedom of contract. This recently manifested court
concern for the employee is unnecessary. The courts have
seemingly ignored, if not abandoned, the rights of the em-
ployer to not only freely contract but also to employ whom-
ever he chooses.
This comment will begin by tracing the development and
application of the at-will employment relationship and the
three well-established exceptions to that relationship. It will
then discuss the new "good cause" exception, announced by
the California appellate courts, this exception's application,
and its potential impact. In particular, the comment will ex-
amine the employer's rights in at-will employment relation-
ships as affected by the new "good cause" exception and will
argue that the exception violates the employer's due process
rights. Lastly, the comment will conclude that the courts have
improperly usurped the legislature's function by fashioning
new law in the guise of an "exception" to existing law.
II. THE AT-WILL EMPLOYMENT DOCTRINE
A. The Nature of the At-Will Doctrine
The concept of "mutuality of obligation" is the basis for
the at-will employment doctrine established by the United
States Supreme Court in Adair v. United States."3 Under this
concept an employee is never presumed to engage his services
13. 208 U.S. 161 (1908).
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permanently. It would be against public policy to presume an
employee would cut himself off from all chances of improving
his condition. If the employment contract does not perma-
nently bind the employee then it cannot bind the employer;
there would be lack of "mutuality."' 4 The California courts
have concurred with this view which has been codified in Cali-
fornia Labor Code section 2922. Employment at-will' enables
either party, the employer or the employee, to terminate with
or without cause'" even in the presence of ill will or an im-
proper motive.' 7 The employer, unlike the employee, however,
has certain well-defined limitations, not explicit in the statute
itself, placed on his right to discharge which have provided
the employee with considerable protection against
termination.
B. Limitations on the At-Will Doctrine: Protecting the
Employee
1. The Contract Exception
If a contract for permanent employment 8 contains a con-
dition, express or implied, that contradicts the at-will nature
of the agreement, then the employment cannot be terminated
at the will of the employer.' 9 The employee, on the other
hand, is still free to quit his employment at any time as it still
qualifies as an at-will relationship. In California there are two
such contract conditions which will cause an employment con-
tract to be terminable only for good cause. The first such con-
dition is the existence of "independent consideration;" the
14. Pitcher v. United Oil & Gas Syndicate Inc., 174 La. App. 66, 69, 139 So. 760,
761 (1932).
15. California Labor Code section 2922 defines at-will employment as one not
having a specified term. Employment for a specified term means an employment for a
period greater than one month. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2922 (West 1971 & Supp. 1983).
16. Wilson v. Red Bluff Daily News, 237 Cal. App. 2d 87, 46 Cal. Rptr. 591
(1965) (employment not specific as to term is terminable at-will by employer with or
without cause).
17. Marin v. Jacuzzi, 224 Cal. App. 549, 553-54, 36 Cal. Rptr. 880, 883 (1964)
(presence of ill will or improper motive will not destroy an employer's right to dis-
charge at-will employee).
18. "[Plermanent employment ... is interpreted as a contract for an indefinite
period terminable at the will of either party, unless it is based on some consideration
other than the services rendered." Ruinello v. Murray, 36 Cal. 2d 687, 689-90, 227
P.2d 251, 253 (1959).
19. Drzewiecki v. H & R Block, Inc., 24 Cal. App. 3d 695, 703-04, 101 Cal. Rptr.
169, 174 (1972).
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second is an express or implied agreement by the parties that
the employee may be terminated only for good cause. 0
a. "Independent Consideration." Under the first con-
tract condition, in order for an employment relationship not
to be terminable at the employer's will, the contract must be
supported by some consideration independent of and in addi-
tion to the services to be rendered by the employee. This in-
dependent consideration is considered sufficient to eliminate
the employer's right to discharge the employee at his will. As
an example, if the employer has said, "in consideration of
[your] purchasing [a certain automobile,] we are offering you
employment.. . . This employment is to be steady so long as
your services are satisfactory."21 The purchase of the car by
the employee is the independent consideration and is suffi-
cient to bind the employer to his promise to terminate only if
the employee's services prove unsatisfactory. If, on the other
hand, the same promise not to terminate except if services
prove unsatisfactory had been made by the employer but the
employee had not purchased the car, there would be no inde-
pendent consideration and the employment would be consid-
ered terminable at-will.
The courts have recently held that it is not their function
to question the adequacy of the consideration given by the
employee. Therefore, if a contract expressly limits the em-
ployer's power to terminate his employees, the employee's ser-
vices alone will be consideration enough to support the em-
ployee's claim to wages, and also to supply the required
"independent consideration" necessary to bind the employer
to the contract's termination terms.22 In the previous example
then, even if the employee had not purchased the automobile,
his services alone would now be viewed as sufficient considera-
tion to bind the employer to his promise to terminate only for
unsatisfactory work. It is important to note, however, that in
order for this exception to apply, there must be an express
contractual agreement as to the conditions which would jus-
20. Rabago-Alvarez v. Dart Ind., Inc., 55 Cal. App. 3d 91, 96, 127 Cal. Rptr. 222,
225 (1976). Accord Cleary v. American Airlines, 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 452, 168 Cal.
Rptr. 722, 727 (1980).
21. Seifert v. Arnold Bros., Inc., 138 Cal. App. 324, 325, 31 P.2d 1054, 1059
(1934) (the purchase of the car was independent consideration for the promise to
terminate only if services were unsatisfactory).
22. 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980).
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tify termination. Consequently, referring again to the above
example, if the employer had not expressly promised that he
would terminate only for "unsatisfactory work," all of the in-
dependent consideration in the world would not have dimin-
ished the employer's right to discharge at-will. Only a few Cal-
ifornia courts have applied "independent consideration" as
justification for holding the employer liable for wrongful dis-
charge, and the courts were usually reluctant to do so "despite
unusually persuasive factual situations."2 3
b. Express or Implied Agreement Between the Parties.
The second condition in California which causes an employ-
ment contract to be terminable by the employer only for good
cause, is an express or implied agreement between the parties
to that effect regardless of the existence of "independent con-
sideration." If an employment contract has no specified term
as to its duration, it is presumed to be an at-will contract.2 If
a term or terms of the contract expressly or impliedly contra-
dict this at-will presumption, then the employment will no
longer be considered terminable at-will. For example, if the
employment contract provides that employment will continue
only as long as the employee properly conducts the business,
the courts have readily found that a "good cause" provision
has been placed into the contract.2 5 The employer is conse-
quently precluded from terminating except for good cause. In
another case the employer assured the employee that she
would only be terminated for good cause, specifically, if she
failed to perform her functions and assignments.26 The court
held that even if the employer was in good faith dissatisfied
with the employee's work, he could not discharge her, as the
contract specifically entitled him to discharge the employee
only if she "failed to perform her function and assign-
ments. ' 27 In the above examples, the contract itself made the
employment terminable only for good cause. In other words,
23. Id. at 449, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 726 (citing Ferreyra v. E & J Gallo Winery, 231
Cal. App. 2d 426, 41 Cal. Rptr. 819 (1964) and Becket v. Welton Becket & Assoc., 39
Cal. App. 3d 815, 114 Cal. Rptr. 531 (1974)).
24. See supra note 15.
25. Drzewiecki v. H & R Block, Inc., 24 Cal. App. 3d 695, 101 Cal. Rptr. 169
(the employee could now be discharged unless he failed to properly conduct the
business).
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even though a contract technically may be "at-will," if specific
terms of the contract indicate otherwise, the courts will ignore
the at-will status and enforce those terms.
Moreover, in making its determination of the nature and
scope of the contractual agreement, the court will not only
look to the contract's express language but will also look for
implied contractual terms. For instance, if a management pol-
icy provides that the employer shall rehire from those employ-
ees previously laid off, or it provides specific procedures for
adjudicating employee disputes, and the policy is intended to
benefit the employees and is not "mere management guide-
lines," that policy will become a part of the contract." Like-
wise, any positive inducement that may be given by an em-
ployer to obtain his employee's employment acceptance or
continuance will also be considered as part of the employment
contract.2 9
2. The Statutory Exception
Under this exception to the at-will doctrine, an employer
is forbidden from discharging an employee for reasons which
are contrary to statutory law. Through this exception, an em-
ployee's legal rights are protected. The California Legislature,
by statute, has expressly limited the employer's right to dis-
charge an employee for a variety of reasons including race,
sex, religion, 0 age,31 and political affiliation.32 Additionally, an
employer has no right to discharge an employee when that
28. Hepp v. Lockheed-California Co., 86 Cal. App. 3d 714, 150 Cal. Rptr. 408(1978) (layoff rehiring policy held to be a positive inducement for employees to take
job and a term in employment contract).
29. See Chinn v. China Nat'l Aviation Corp., 138 Cal. App. 2d 98, 291 P.2d 91
(1955) (reliance by employee on regulations enacted by employer to induce employee
to stay in employment constitutes sufficient consideration to bind employer to those
regulations).
30. CAL. GOv'T CODE § 12940 (West 1980 & Supp. 1983) provides that no em-
ployer shall refuse to hire or employ a person because of race, religion, color, national
origin, ancestry, physical handicap, medical condition, marital status, or sex of that
person.
31. CAL. GOv'T CODE § 12941 (West 1980 & Supp. 1983) provides that it is un-
lawful for an employer to discharge any individual over the age of 40 on the ground of
age except in cases where the law compels or provides such action.
32. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1101 (West 1971) provides that no employer shall, through
regulation, forbid, prevent, or control the political activities or affiliations of
employees.
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employee does any of the following: asserts his civil rights,3
including participation in elections3' and service as a juror or
witness at a trial;85 seeks protection of the minimum wage
laws;" or refuses to perform work under unsafe conditions.3 "
The above examples illustrate how the legislature, by express
statute, has curtailed an employer's right to discharge at-will.
3. The Public Policy Exception
The third exception to the at-will doctrine prohibits an
employer from discharging an employee for reasons which are
contrary to public policy. It is based on a "principle of law
which holds that no citizen can lawfully do that which has a
tendency to be injurious to the public or against the public
good . . . ." The first major case in California which dealt
with this exception was Petermann v. International Brother-
hood of Teamsters.3 ' There, an employee was discharged
when he refused to commit perjury on his employer's behalf.
The court imposed liability on the employer, finding it to be
against public policy to discharge an employee for that em-
ployee's failure to commit a crime. Later, in furtherance of
this exception, the California courts held that discharging an
employee "solely because of his membership or activity in a
33. CAL. LAB. CODE § 98.6(a) (West Supp. 1983) provides that no person shall
discharge or discriminate against any employee because such employee filed any bona
fide complaint or caused to be instituted any proceeding relating to his rights, or has
testified or will testify in any such proceeding on behalf of himself or others of any
rights afforded him.
34. CAL. ELEC. CODE § 1655 (West 1977 & Supp. 1983) provides that no person
shall be suspended or discharged from any service or employment because of absence
while serving as an election officer on election day.
35. CAL. LAB. CODE § 230 (West 1971 & Supp. 1983) provides that no employer
shall discharge or discriminate against an employee for taking time off to appear in
court as a witness or to serve on an inquest or trial jury, if reasonable notice is given
to the employer that he is required to appear in court.
36. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1197 (West 1971 & Supp. 1983) provides that "[t]he mini-
mum wage for employees fixed by the commission is the minimum wage to be paid to
employees, and the payment of a less wage than the minimum so fixed is unlawful."
See also Montalvo v. Zamora, 7 Cal. App. 3d 69, 86 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1970).
37. CAL. LAB. CODE § 6311 (West Supp. 1982) provides in part:
[n]o employee shall be . . . discharged for refusing to work in the per-
formance of which this code . . . , any occupational safety or health
standard or any safety order of the division or standards board will be
violated, where such violation would create a real and apparent hazard
to the employee or his fellow employees.
38. Noble v. City of Palo Alto, 89 Cal. App. 47, 50, 530 P. 529, 530 (1928).
39. 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959).
270 [Vol. 23
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labor union" was against public policy.0 Tameny v. Atlantic
Richfield CO.41 contains the most recent expression of the
public policy exception; an employee's termination for his fail-
ure to participate in a price fixing scheme, a clear violation of
public policy, constituted wrongful discharge.42
Through the contract, statutory, and public policy excep-
tions to Labor Code section 2922, the California Legislature
and the courts, have considerably diminished the employer's
discretion to determine those individuals whom he would em-
ploy. At least one commentator" has pointed out abuses from
which the employee should be protected: termination because
of race or religion, for refusing to commit a criminal act, for
exercising one's civil rights, and for the exercise of political
free choice." The employee has been amply protected by the
three exceptions to at-will employment discussed above. As a
result, the employer's discretion has been sharply curtailed.
This protection afforded to employees today is admit-
tedly very important and it should be maintained. The prob-
lem does not lie in what the courts and the legislature have
done to provide such protection, but rather, it lies in what the
courts have introduced to further limit the employer's rights.
Just as the employee has certain basic rights, so does the em-
ployer, namely, the right to freely contract for services, in-
cluding the right not to have contractual obligations thrust
upon him, and the right to use his best business judgment to
hire and fire whomever he chooses. As will be discussed below,
it appears very likely that in an over-zealous campaign to
champion the employee's cause, the courts have gone too far
and as a result employers have been left virtually unprotected.
40. Glenn v. Clearman's Golden Cock Inn, 192 Cal. App. 2d 793, 798, 13 Cal.
Rptr. 769, 772 (1961) (discharge of an employee for membership in a union against
public policy, and creates basis for civil liability against the employer). The California
Legislature codified this exception in Labor Code sections 922 and 923, which provide
that there is a basis for civil liability where an employee at-will is terminated for
union activity. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 922, 923 (West 1971).
41. 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980).
42. The court in Tameney held that a cause of action for wrongful discharge
sounded both in tort and contract law, thus making it possible to collect punitive
damages in tort where before this had not been allowed under a contract action. Id.
43. Blades, Employment At Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the
Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404 (1967).
44. Id. at 1433.
19831
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III. THE NEW "GOOD CAUSE" TERMINATION EXCEPTION
In 1980 the California Supreme Court held in Tameny v.
Atlantic Richfield Co.45 that a cause of action for wrongful
discharge was stated for an employee's termination based on
his refusal to participate in a price fixing scheme. The court
based its decision on the public policy exception discussed
above; in order to implement the fundamental public policies
embodied in the state's penal statutes all employers have a
law-imposed duty not to discharge employees who refuse to
commit a criminal act." Although the court did not at this
time so hold, it did allude to a possible contract cause of ac-
tion against the employer for breach of an implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing. The court stated in a footnote
that it was unnecessary to determine whether recovery would
sound in contract on the theory of breach of the covenant. It
noted that other jurisdictions had so found, and that past Cal-
ifornia cases had held that breach of the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing could sound in contract as well as in
tort
Later in 1980, in Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc.,4 8 this
potential cause of action was given more attention by the
court when it specifically held that the combination of the
employee's eighteen years of service and the employer's ex-
press policy of providing specific procedures for adjudicating
employee disputes, precluded the employer from discharging
that specific employee without good cause.49 In the court's
opinion, after such a long period of employment the termina-
tion of an employee without good cause offended the implied-
in-law covenant of good faith and fair dealing inherent in all
45. 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980).
46. Id. at 176, 610 P.2d at 1335, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 844.
47. Id. at 179 n.12, 610 P.2d at 1337 n.12, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 846 n.12.
48. 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980).
49. Id. at 456, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 729. In Cleary, an employee who had worked for
an airline for 18 years brought an action against his employer for wrongful discharge
from employment and breach of an oral contract for an unspecified term. The trial
court sustained defendant's demurrers and dismissed the case. The court of appeal
reversed. The court held that plaintiff's allegation that he was discharged due to his
union organizing activities pleaded one of the recognized public policy exceptions to
the rule of Labor Code section 2922, and thus stated a cause of action. The court also
held that longevity of plaintiff's service, 18 years, along with the express policy of the
employer to provide specific procedures for adjudicating employee disputes, operated
as an estoppel to discharge without good cause. Id. at 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 722.
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contracts.5 0
Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc.51 is the most recent in the
line of cases which have dealt with the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing. The appellate court acknowledged
that if, as the Cleary court found, the implied-in-law covenant
of good faith and fair dealing is found in all employment con-
tracts and the covenant also requires "good cause" for termi-
nation, then the plaintiff employee would be afforded such
protection; his employment was nearly twice the duration of
the plaintiff's in Cleary.2 The Pugh court, however, declared
that it "need not go that far."58 The court instead explained
the Cleary decision and its own decision in traditional con-
tract terms: the employer's conduct constituted an implied
promise not to act arbitrarily in discharging its employees,
and the promise, by application of the contract exception to
the at-will doctrine, therefore became a part of the employ-
ment contract.
5 4
Each of these three cases can be read to fall within the
existing exceptions to the at-will doctrine: Tameny relied
upon the recognized public policy exception, while both
Cleary and Pugh encompass the contract exceptions. In the
latter two cases, it is conceivable that the appropriate result
could have been arrived at based simply on the existence of
the grievance procedures and acknowledged employer policies
which were not followed. These procedures could have been
seen as a benefit to the employee, something the employee
may have relied upon in deciding to accept or continue em-
ployment, and not mere management guidelines. Under the
contract exception, when an employer's policies are intended
50. Id. at 445, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 723.
51. 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1981). In Pugh, a vice president in
charge of production (also a member of the corporation's board of directors), who had
been employed for 32 years by See's, brought an action alleging that he had been
fired for reasons against public policy and breach of contract. The trial court granted
defendant's motions for nonsuit. The court of appeal reversed. The court found the
plaintiff's evidence lacking in establishing the violation of public policy but did find
evidence sufficient for a jury to find an implied promise only to terminate for good
cause. This evidence included the duration of plaintiff's employment, the commenda-
tions, and promotions he received, the apparent lack of any direct criticism of his
work, the assurances he was given of continued employment, and the employer's ac-
knowledged policies. Id.
52. Pugh had worked for See's Candies for 32 years before his discharge. Id.
53. Id. at 329, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 927.
54. Id.
1983]
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
to benefit the employees and not to act as guidelies for man-
agement, the policies become a part of the employment con-
tract.5 The grievance procedures, therefore, would have be-
come a term of the employment contract itself. By not
following those procedures the employer had breached the
contract. The potential impact, however, of the actual disposi-
tion of the cases extends far beyond a mere reiteration of the
existing exceptions to the at-will doctrine. While the existence
of a covenant of good faith and fair dealing in employment
contracts has never been the sole basis for a court's decision
against an employer, the court considered it a major factor in
Cleary.
The precise implications of the Cleary holding are as yet
unclear. One commentator has already interpreted the case as
suggesting that "after an unspecified period of time a 'just
cause' standard will be implied in all at-will employment con-
tracts. '56 If this standard is accepted, only termination for
"good cause" will satisfy the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing. The courts will have virtually repealed Labor Code
section 2922 and the at-will doctrine. This is the direction in
which the courts are headed, using the covenant of good faith
and fair dealing to impose a "good cause" requirement for ter-
mination. The rights of the employer not only have been ig-
nored, but the wise and thoughtful judgment of the California
Legislature has been overruled.
A. The Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing in
General
There is an implied covenant of good faith and fair deal-
ing in every contract which provides that neither party to the
contract will do any act or acts which will injure the other
party's right to receive the benefits of the agreement.5 7 The
duty imposed by the covenant, that of dealing fairly and in
good faith with the other party, is a duty imposed by law
rather than one arising from the terms of the contract itself."
55. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
56. Bresler and Murphy, Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., A Sweeping Excep-
tion to the At-Will Rule in Employment Contracts, CEB 2 CAL. Bus. L. REP. 5, 6
(1981).
57. Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 658, 328 P.2d 198, 200
(1958).
58. Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 578, 510 P.2d 1032, 1040, 108
[Vol. 23
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Accordingly, this duty exists whether or not the parties have
consented thereto.
The covenant of good faith and fair dealing was initially
developed in California in the context of insurance con-
tracts. 9 The typical case involved an insured who had suf-
fered a loss which was covered by his insurance policy, but for
which the insurance company had failed, without proper
cause, to compensate him. The California courts have tradi-
tionally viewed this type of situation, where the insurance
company knows that it owes the insured under the policy but
nevertheless refuses to pay, as outrageous and unconscionable
conduct bordering on fraud. 0 This particular conduct has
specifically been held to breach the covenant of good faith and
fair dealing implicit within the insurance contract by injuring
the insured's right to receive his benefits under the policy. 1
It is important to note that in the insurance cases, the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing is applied only to the
existing terms of the contract as agreed to by the parties. If a
duty exists under the contract terms to, for example, pay out
proceeds to the insured, then any action by the insurance
company which is contrary to those terms constitutes bad
faith and necessarily breaches the covenant. The parties
themselves are free to define their respective obligations and
duties by specific terms of the contract; however, no matter
what those duties may be, the performance of them must be
in good faith.62
On the other hand, if there are no existing contract terms
Cal. Rptr. 480, 488 (1973).
59. The application of the covenant to insurance contracts was first expressed
in Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 328 P.2d 198 (1958). It was
later upheld in Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr.
13 (1967), and Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal.
Rptr. 480 (1973).
60. Justice Pro Tern Roth dissenting in Gruenberg, mentions that "[s]everal
cases, in considering the liability of the insurer, contain language to the effect that
bad faith is the equivalent of dishonesty, fraud, and concealment." Gruenberg v.
Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 583, 510 P.2d 1032, 1043, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480, 491 (citing
Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 430, 426 P.2d 173, 176, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13, 16
(1967)). See also Critz v. Farmers Ins. Group, 230 Cal. App. 2d 788, 796, 41 Cal. Rptr.
401, 405 (1964); Palmer v. Financial Indem. Co., 215 Cal. App. 2d 419, 429, 30 Cal.
Rptr. 204, 208 (1963); Davy v. Public Nat'l Ins. Co., 181 Cal. App. 2d 387, 396, 5 Cal.
Rptr. 488, 492-93 (1960).
61. Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal. Rptr.
480.
62. Id. at 578, 510 P.2d at 1040, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 488.
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which create a duty, there would be nothing to which the cov-
enant could be applied. As will be more fully developed below,
in an at-will employment contract there are no contract terms
which create any duty regarding the act of termination by ei-
ther party. Consequently, the covenant would not be applica-
ble to acts of termination.
B. The Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing as Ap-
plied to the At-Will Doctrine
The Court of Appeal in Cleary v. American Airlines,
Inc.6 applied the covenant of good faith and fair dealing to
at-will employment contracts. The court found that the em-
ployer had wrongfully terminated the employee, based on two
factors: The length of the employee's service, and a company
policy requiring it to follow a specific grievance procedure in
handling employee disputes. The court stated that after such
a long period of service, termination without good cause would
breach the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Further,
the court felt that the existence of the grievance procedures
evidenced the employer's recognition of its responsibility not
to act arbitrarily with respect to its employees. 4 It has been
suggested that the result of this finding was the creation of an
implied duty of good faith and fair dealing in employment
contracts, requiring that all employees be terminated only for
good cause. 65
1. The Covenant Must Be Applied to Existing Terms of
the Employment Contract
In applying the covenant of good faith and fair dealing to
employment contracts it is important to look at the benefits
each party derives from the agreement, because under the
covenant each party must refrain from injuring those bene-
fits.6 In an employment contract terminable at-will, one of
the primary benefits to both parties-employer or em-
ployee-is the ability to terminate the relationship at any
time for whatever reason, and not to be "locked in" to the
63. 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980).
64. Id. at 455, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 729.
65. Vol. 20 SACRAMENTO REPORT No. 21 (May 29, 1981).
66. 50 Cal. 2d at 658, 328 P.2d at 200.
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employment relationship. 7 If, however, it is only the em-
ployer who is not allowed to discharge the employee for good
cause as the covenant requires, then he is being denied one of
the most important benefits of his agreement. The employee,
who is not reciprocally hampered by this "good cause" re-
quirement, is provided with greater benefits than those to
which he is entitled."
In Cleary, the court considered the employee's longevity
of service and the internal grievance system that the employer
did not follow, as evidence of the employer's bad faith in dis-
charging the employee. This employer conduct, however, is a
far cry from the outrageous, unconscionable conduct found in
the insurance company cases where the covenant of good faith
and fair dealing originated.
Moreover, in an at-will employment relationship there is
no contract term imposing a duty on the employer regarding
discharge. As was seen earlier in the insurance cases, there is
no term to the contract to which the covenant does not ap-
ply.6 9 By definition, pure at-will employment contracts place
no duty on the employer or the employee to terminate the
employment for any specific reason.7 0 The only duty, if it can
be called such, is for either party to exercise his will, the em-
ployee's will to leave and the employer's will to discharge.
If the employer or the employee had a duty to terminate
the contract only for a specific reason or reasons, then the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing would apply to those
contractual terms of dismissal; employer good faith would
have to be exercised with respect to those terms. An example
of this can be seen where dissatisfaction by the employer with
the employee's job performance is the express or implied con-
tractual grounds for dismissal. Dissatisfaction with the em-
ployee's services is a contract term agreed upon by both par-
ties. As such, in order to rightfully terminate the employee,
the employer must in good faith be dissatisfied with the em-
ployee's services.71 If the employer is not in good faith dissat-
67. Brief for Respondent at 13, Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 111 Cal. App.
3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980).
68. Id.
69. See supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
70. Notice of termination to the other party, is the only requirement under La-
bor Code section 2922. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2922 (West Supp. 1982).
71. Coats v. General Motors Corp., 3 Cal. App. 2d 340, 39 P.2d 838 (1934). "To
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isfied with the employee's job performance, but nevertheless
discharges him, the covenant is breached.
Good faith, however, cannot be said to apply to some-
thing which is not a contract "duty." The Cleary court may
indeed have been correct in finding an employer duty not to
arbitrarily discharge his employees; a duty based upon estab-
lished grievance procedures. Nevertheless, by applying this
covenant to all at-will employment situations, regardless of
the specific contractual provisions, the court has not only cre-
ated a duty never contemplated by the parties but has also
imposed the exercise of good faith with respect to that "duty."
2. The Covenant's Requirement of "Good Cause"
The Cleary court did not stop at merely applying the cov-
enant of good faith and fair dealing to at-will employment
contracts, it further required "good cause" in order to satisfy
the covenant.72 This requirement of "good cause," however,
does not follow from prior application of the covenant. First,
"good faith" is not the equivalent of "good cause"; where good
cause for termination was required by contract terms, dismis-
sal of an employee without "good cause" has nevertheless
been upheld in situations where there was good faith. 8 When
the employer exercised good faith, "good cause" was appar-
ently not needed. Second, good faith only applies to the con-
tract terms and "good cause" is not a term of an at-will em-
ployment contract. If "good cause" was an actual contract
term, then the covenant of good faith and fair dealing would
not be necessary to enforce that term. Under the contract ex-
ception to the at-will employment doctrine such terms will be
hold otherwise would prevent an employer from firing a employee except for good
cause shown in every situation. We are not here dealing with the hiring to the satis-
faction of the employer, where good faith is a proper test." Main v. Jacuzzi, 224 Cal.
App. 2d 549, 554, 36 Cal. Rptr. 880, 883 (1964) (citing Coats v. General Motors Corp.,
3 Cal. App. 2d 340, 348, 39 P.2d 838, 841 (1934)).
72. The court stated that "[tiermination of employment without legal cause af-
ter such a period of time offends the implied-in-law convenant of good faith and fair
dealing contained in all contracts, including employment contracts." 111 Cal. App. 3d
at 455, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 729 (emphasis added).
73. Wanee v. Board of Directors, 56 Cal. App. 3d 644, 128 Cal. Rptr. 526 (1976).
"Under the laws which govern private corporations, [as opposed to a governmental
entity] petitioner, as an employee thereof, has no right insulating him against dismis-
sal which is made in good faith but without cause." Id. at 649, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 529,
(citing Petermann v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d
25 (1959) and Coats v. General Motors Corp., 3 Cal. App. 2d 340, 39 P.2d 838 (1934)).
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enforced, and the contract will no longer be considered "ter-
minable at-will. 1 7 4 The Pugh court recognized that the con-
tract exception provided sufficient support for its own deci-
sion, as well as support for the Cleary court's decision, to
impose liability on the employer for wrongful discharge. The
Cleary court, by not adhering to existing law, apparently tried
to impose a "good cause" requirement in at-will employment
situations through the guise of the covenant of good faith and
fair dealing. The "good cause" requirement, however, does not
naturally flow from the covenant itself. The court in essence
imposed a new term on an existing contract. As will be dis-
cussed below, this is unconstitutional; it not only interferes
with an existing contractual relationship between the em-
ployer and the employee, but it also infringes on the em-
ployer's right to due process.
IV. UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE "GOOD CAUSE" REQUIRE-
MENT: THE EMPLOYER'S RIGHTS
A. The "Good Cause" Exception: An Interference With
Contract
The Contract Clause of the United States Constitution
provides that the states shall not interfere with private con-
tracts or impose new terms on any party to an existing con-
tract if those parties have not contemplated or agreed to such
terms.7 ' What the courts have apparently overlooked, how-
ever, is that by imposing a "good cause" requirement on the
employer's right to discharge an at-will employee, they have
written a new contract term not contemplated by the parties,
and thus have interfered with the at-will employment con-
tract. It might also be argued that the contract, statutory, and
public policy exceptions constitute interferences with con-
tract, and thus also are unconstitutional. On the contrary, un-
like the "good cause" exception, these three exceptions do not
interfere with the contractual relationship and are not viola-
tions of the Contract Clause.
74. "[A] contract for permanent employment ... cannot be terminated at the
will of the employer if it contains an express or implied condition to the contrary."
Drzewiecki v. H & R Block, Inc., 24 Cal. App. 3d 695, 704, 101 Cal. Rptr. 169, 174
(1972). See also supra text accompanying notes 22-27.
75. U.S. CONST. 'art. I, § 10, cl. 1 provides that "[n]o State shall ... pass any
... Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts . .. ."
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The contract exception to the at-will doctrine does not
impose new contractual terms, it merely enforces express or
implied obligations already created under the contract by the
parties themselves. Further, both the statutory exception and
the public policy exception have actually been provided for by
the United States Supreme Court through its interpretation
of the Contract Clause. In interpreting the Constitution the
Court has established that:
[N]either the "contract" clause nor the "due process"
clause has the effect of overriding the power of the State
to establish all regulations that are reasonably necessary
to secure the health, safety, good order, comfort, or gen-
eral welfare of the community; that this power can
neither be abdicated nor bargained away, and is inaliena-
ble even by express grant; and that all contract and prop-
erty rights are held subject to its fair exercise.76
Furthermore, it has been said that the major purpose of the
Contract Clause is to restrain states from creating laws affect-
ing private contracts, not to be an inflexible barrier to public
regulation.77 The statutory exception to the at-will doctrine
limits an employer's right to discharge employees. This excep-
tion is consistent with existing statutes enacted to safeguard
the general public welfare by protecting employees.7 8 Simi-
larly, the public policy exception is derived from the principle
of law which makes it unlawful for any citizen to do any act
which tends to injure the public, or which is against public
policy. Both of these exceptions fall in line with the recog-
nized limitation to the Contract Clause, that of necessary
public regulation.
All three of the established exceptions complement the
Contract Clause rather than contradict it. The "good cause"
exception, however, is an unwarranted regulation and an un-
constitutonal interference with the employer-employee rela-
tionship. "Good cause" for termination is now being imposed
76. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., v. Goldsboro, 232 U.S. 548 (1914). As the Court
stated in Manigault v. Springs 199 U.S. 473 (1905), "parties by entering into con-
tracts may not estop the legislature from enacting laws intended for the public good."
Id. at 480.
77. G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 604-05 (9th ed.
1975); see also Home Building & Loan v. Blaisdale, 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
78. See supra notes 30-37 and accompanying text.
79. Petermann v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 188,
344 P.2d 25, 27 (1959).
[Vol. 23
AT- WILL EMPLOYMENT
on the employer in at-will employment contracts without such
a requirement ever having been contemplated or agreed upon
by the parties. This constitutes a violation of the Contract
Clause. This exception to the at-will doctrine is not embodied
in any of the other three exceptions, which do not violate the
Contract Clause. If it had been, it seems reasonable to con-
clude that the courts would not have found it necessary to
separately articulate the exception. Instead, the courts would
merely have held that "good cause" is required for termina-
tion by virtue of the already existing contract or public policy
exceptions. Further, the legislature has not enacted any stat-
ute which sets forth a "good cause" exception, so that such
limitation could be enforced through the use of the statutory
exception. On the contrary, the legislature has apparently re-
affirmed the at-will doctrine, as evidenced by its failure to
amend that portion of Labor Code section 2922.80
In both the Cleary and Pugh cases the courts did inter-
fere with the contract by imposing a new and uncontemplated
term on the employer, longevity of service, which affected his
freedom to discharge. Both courts held that because the em-
ployee had worked a certain length of time for the employer,
the employer was precluded from discharging the employee
except for "good cause."'" The particular contracts involved in
these cases, however, did not themselves expressly or im-
pliedly provide that if the employee remained in service for a
long enough period of time, the employer would not discharge
him except for "good cause." The courts, by requiring "good
cause" termination based on the employee's longevity of ser-
vice, imposed a new term on the contracting parties, and in so
doing violated the Contract Clause and both the employer's
and employee's constitutional right to be free from interfer-
ence with their contract.
Labor Code section 1155.2(a),82 which is contained within
the California Agricultural Labor Relations Act (ALRA),
lends further support to the basic policy discussed above that
contract terms may not be imposed upon the employer or the
employee if those parties have not contemplated or agreed to
80. Labor Code section 2922 was last amended in 1971. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2922
(West 1971 & Supp. 1983).
81. See supra notes 48-54 and accompanying text.
82. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1155.2(a) (West Supp. 1983).
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such terms. The ALRA' s governs collective bargaining and ag-
ricultural labor relations unions in California. It imposes upon
the employer and the union the obligation to bargain collec-
tively in good faith. As specifically provided by section
1155.2(a), however, such obligation does not "compel either
party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a conces-
sion. ' 84 Therefore, while California has committed itself to the
collective bargaining principles as a matter of public policy, 85
it has also clearly set forth as a matter of public policy, that
contract terms may not be imposed upon the employer or the
employee, at least within the context of collective bargaining
relationships under the ALRA. This can be viewed as further
support for the argument set forth above: The parties to an
at-will employment relationship should be free from the im-
position of new and uncontemplated terms to their at-will em-
ployment contract. If the courts were allowed to impose a
"good cause" requirement for termination on all employment
contracts, including at-will contracts, not only would they be
interfering with the at-will employment contract and the em-
ployer's constitutional rights therein, but they would be acting
in direct opposition to California's public policy against im-
posing contract terms on an employer.
B. The "Good Cause" Exception: A Violation of Due
Process
The Supreme Court of the United States has recognized
83. The ALRA was modeled in large part after the National Labor Relations
Act (NLRA) of 1935, which specifically excluded agricultural labor from its coverage.
84. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1155.2(a) (West Supp. 1983). Section 1155.2(a) provides:
[T]o bargain collectively in good faith is the performance of the mutual
obligation of the agricultural employer and the representative of the ag-
ricultural employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good
faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any questions aris-
ing thereunder; and the execution of a written contract incorporating
any agreement reached if requested by either party, but such obligation
does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the mak-
ing of a concession.
(emphasis added).
85. It has been announced by the legislature, through the enactment of Labor
Code sections 920-23 that it is the public policy of this state to advance the freedom
of employees to organize into unions and enter into collective bargaining agreements
for their own protection. Glenn v. Clearman's Golden Cock Inn, 192 Cal. App. 2d 793,
798, 13 Cal. Rptr. 769, 772 (1961).
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an employer's interest in entering into employment contracts
which are terminable at-will as a constitutionally protected
right.86 In Adair v. United States87 the Court specifically
stated that as the employee had the right to quit the service
of his employer for whatever reason, so too had the employer
the same right to dispense with the employee's services for
whatever reason.8 8 The Court further declared that any fed-
eral legislation which altered this equality between the em-
ployer and the employee by compelling the employer to retain
the employee's personal services constituted "an invasion of
the personal liberty, [of the employer] as well as the right of
property, guaranteed by [the fifth] Amendment."8 9
Through the development of the contract, statutory, and
public policy exceptions to the at-will employment relation-
ship, restrictions have already been placed upon the em-
ployer's right to choose those personal services he will or will
not retain. This has limited the employer's right to liberty and
property: The Adair Court itself recognized the appropriate-
ness of these limitations.90 The basic principle underlying at-
will employment relationships, that of the employee's freedom
to quit and the employer's freedom to fire, however, has re-
mained unchanged. It is important to note that these limita-
tions do not completely abrogate the employer's rights in at-
86. Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 175-76 (1908); Coppage v. Kansas, 236
U.S. 1 (1915).
87. 208 U.S. 161 (1908).
88. Id. at 175.
89. Id. at 172. The Court in Adair went on to say,
it is not within the function of government at least in the absence of
contract between the parties-to compel any person in the course of his
business and against his will to accept or retain the personal services of
another, or to compel any person, against his will, to perform personal
services for another. The right of a person to sell his labor upon such
terms as he deems proper is, in its essence, the same as the right of the
purchaser of labor to prescribe the conditions upon which he will accept
such labor from the person offering to sell it.
Id. at 174.
90. The Adair Court stated that Due Process:
Embraces the right to make contracts for the purchase of the labor of
others and equally the right to make contracts for the sale of one's own
labor; each right, however, being subject to the fundamental condition
that no contract, whatever its subject matter, can be sustained which
the law, upon reasonable grounds forbids as inconsistent with the public
interest or as hurtful to the public order or as detrimental to the com-
mon good.
208 U.S. at 172.
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will employment contracts, they only modify them. If the
state were to deprive the employer of the at-will employment
bargain completely, by imposition of the "good cause" re-
quirement, it would deprive the employer of his fourteenth
amendment due process rights to liberty and property."
The employer's personal liberty to decide whom he shall
employ, to whom he will trust the running of his business, and
the right to expend his property (money) as he sees fit are
rights which are protected under the Due Process Clause of
the United States Constitution. These basic rights, as well as
the entire at-will doctrine, would be eliminated if the "good
cause" exception is ever formally accepted. A state is free to
increase a citizen's constitutional rights, but it may not de-
crease those rights. 2 The California courts have, however, re-
duced the employee's constitutional rights of freedom to con-
tract and due process. Moreover, as will be set forth more
fully below, in so doing the courts have improperly usurped
the legislature's lawmaking function.
V. THE COURT'S USURPATION OF THE LEGISLATIVE FUNCTION
In our legal system, it is well-settled that the court's role
is to consistently interpret and administer the law as it is set
forth by the legislature. The California Legislature, through
the enactment of Labor Code section 2922, granted employers
authority to hire and terminate employees. Any restrictions or
redefinitions of that authority should likewise emanate, ex-
plicitly or implicitly, from the legislature. The legislature has
in fact exercised its power by prohibiting various forms of em-
ployer conduct through the enactment of statutes which spe-
cifically limit an employer's right to discharge employees." As
was discussed above, such action by the legislature has given
rise to the statutory exception to the at-will doctrine. 4 The
California Legislature, however, has not seen fit to delete or
91. The fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution provides that
no State shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law . U. " U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
92. Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980) (the state is
not limited in its right to adopt in its own constitution individual liberties more ex-
pansive than those in federal constitution).
93. Amicus brief, Application for California Conference of Employer Associa-
tions (CCEA); At-Will Employment Contract, Conboy v. Sears, CCEA Newsletter
Vol. 20 No. 12 (August 17, 1981).
94. See supra notes 30-37 and accompanying text.
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even amend the at-will provision of Labor Code section 2922,
despite the fact that other provisions of that statute were
amended as late as 1971. 95
In carrying out their function as interpreters of the law,
the courts have thus far consistently applied the three estab-
lished exceptions to Labor Code section 2922 by looking at
other legislative enactments where possible to glean the legis-
lative intent behind this labor code section. For instance,
through the penal system the legislature has enacted a statute
declaring the act of perjury to be a crime. 6 Consistent with
this expressed legislative will, the courts have created the
public policy exception to at-will employment which prohibits
an employer from discharging an employee because the em-
ployee refused to commit perjury on the employer's behalf.9 7
Now, however, through the introduction of a possible
"good cause" exception to the at-will doctrine the courts have
ventured into the legislative realm of lawmaking, rather than
adhering to their interpretive role as they did with respect to
the other three exceptions. As one court itself has declared
"[i]t is not the function of the courts in the absence of con-
tractual, statutory, or public policy considerations to compel a
person to accept or retain another in his employ nor to compel
a person against his will to remain in the employ of an-
other."" Through the enactment of Labor Code section 2922,
the California Legislature has made it quite clear that the em-
ployer is to have the broadest discretion in discharging at-will
employees and that this discretion is to be limited only if its
exercise conflicts with an expressed public policy of greater
value.99 As has been noted, in both Cleary v. American Air-
lines, Inc., °00 and Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc.,01 the courts, by
95. Labor Code section 2922 was amended in 1971 by deletion of that portion
dealing with the garnishment of wages. That portion is now incorporated into new
Labor Code section 2929. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 2922, 2929 (West*1971 & Supp. 1983).
96. The commission of perjury and the act of soliciting the commission of the
act of perjury are unlawful. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 118, 653(f) (West 1970 & Supp.
1983).
97. Petermann v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344
P.2d 25 (1959) (against public policy to discharge an employee for his refusal to com-
mit perjury).
98. Matin v. Jacuzzi, 224 Cal. App. 2d 549, 554, 36 Cal. Rptr. 880, 883 (1964).
99. Amicus brief, Application for California Conference of Employer Associa-
tions (CCEA); At-Will Employment Contract, Conboy v. Sears, CCEA Newsletter
Vol. 20 No. 12 (August 17, 1981).
100. 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980).
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advancing the "good cause" exception, have indefensibly
usurped legislative authority by intruding into an area which
the legislature has expressly reserved to the employer's sound
discretion. '
It has often been urged that in the past the California
courts have taken a creative role in the administration of the
law rather than a wholly interpretive role and should continue
to do so in the future.10 3 Circumstances may warrant such in-
terference with the legislature, but as will be more fully devel-
oped below, no such judicial legislation is called for in at-will
employment relationships. It is the legislature who should
make any necessary changes in this area if and when the cir-
cumstances so dictate.
In one very important case involving products liability,"'
the California Supreme Court openly acknowledged the
court's creative role when it decided to hold strictly liable in
tort a manufacturer who marketed a defective product. 05 The
court reasoned that as the manufacturer was better situated
economically to bear the financial burden of injury than was
any single consumer, the manufacturer should be held strictly
liable for product defects.10 6
In the products liability area as opposed to at-will em-
ployment, "judicial legislation" was justified; the court was
sufficiently capable of weighing and balancing the few wholly
economic factors involved. The employment situation, on the
other hand, involves much more than an economic analysis in
that financial burdens are not the only factors to be consid-
ered. Employment does involve the payment and receipt of
compensation for employee services, but it also involves per-
101. 116 Cal. App. 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1981).
102. Amicus brief, Application for California Conference of Employer Associa-
tions (CCEA); At-Will Employment Contract, Conboy v. Sears, CCEA Newsletter
Vol. 20 No. 12 (August 17, 1981).
103. Peck, Unjust Discharges from Employment: A Necessary Change in the
Law, 40 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 41 (1979).
104. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 697 (1963).
105. J. HENDERSON AND B. PEARSON, THE TORTS PRocEss 607 (1975). The tradi-
tional view in products liability was that unless negligence or a breach of warranty
could be proven against the product manufacturer, the consumer would bear the cost
of injury attributable to any product defect.
106. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 24 Cal. 2d 453, 461, 150 P.2d
436, 440 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring) (relying on Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod.,
Inc., 59 Cal. 2d at 63, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701 (1963).
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sonal working relationships, including the interaction between
the employee and the employer, and between an employee
and his fellow employees. 10 7 The evaluation of any change to
be made in at-will employment relationships involves much
more than an evaluation in terms of dollars and cents. In its
recent committee report on At-Will Employment and the
Problems of Unjust Dismissal,'0 8 the Committee on Labor and
Employment Law of the Association of the Bar of the City of
New York expressed its view that if all employees were to en-
joy general protection against discharge without good cause
the change would be accomplished most appropriately by the
legislature. 09 The California Legislature, not the courts, is
better qualified to evaluate and make any necessary changes
to the at-will employment doctrine.
The legislative process enjoys an advantage over the judi-
cial process in that it can make exceptions and establish clas-
sifications that accommodate conflicting interests which at the
same time generally serve the purposes of justice.11 0 The legis-
lature has the resources and the opportunity to consider all of
the possible circumstances, problems, and conflicting interests
in a particular area enabling it to arrive at an all encompass-
ing equitable solution. The court, on the other hand, is limited
by the binding power of precedent and while its impact ex-
tends to the community at large, its focus remains with a cer-
tain set of facts affecting a single plaintiff and a single defen-
dant standing before it.
An illustration of the inadequacy of court-made law as
opposed to legislative enactment, specifically in the area of at-
will employment, is the task of defining "good cause." A defi-
nition of "good cause" should be such that it enables the
"good cause" exception to be consistently applied to all at-will
employment terminations. If it is left to the courts to define in
an ad hoc fashion, it would necessarily be the jury as
factfinder who would determine whether the particular facts
107. "[E]ven a competent person may be of no use to his employer if he cannot
work effectively with his fellow employees." Prigpank & Mooney, Wrongful Dis-
charge: A New Danger for Employers, PERSONNEL AD., March 1981, at 33.
108. Committee on Labor and Employment Law of the Association of the Bar
of the City of New York, Committee Reports - At-will Employment and the Problem
of Unjust Dismissal, 36 THE RECORD (1981).
109. Id. at 197.
110. Peck, supra note 103, at 48-49.
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constituted "good cause" or not."' There is substantial dan-
ger, however, that the jury will identify and sympathize with
the employee and favor him over the employer even though
such a finding may not be warranted by the case's facts. This
could give rise to inconsistent verdicts due to jury bias; one
set of facts may at one time establish liability against the em-
ployer for wrongful discharge and at another time those very
same facts may absolve the employer.
An example of how juries interpret the facts in "good
cause" for discharge. can be seen in a recent at-will employ-
ment case in which the employee was discharged for ordering
falsification of company records in an effort to enhance his
career. The jury found in that case that despite compelling
evidence of the employee's dishonesty in falsifying company
records, and notwithstanding the at-will nature of the employ-
ment, the employer did not have good cause for terminating
the employee." 2 Fraudule nt conduct on the part of the em-
ployee was simply not cionsidered sufficient justification for
his discharge. It appears clear that this is further evidence of
the difficulty facing the courts in dealing equitably with a
"good cause" exception to the at-will doctrine.
Another potential problem to which jury sympathy for
the employee could give rise includes harassing lawsuits by
discontented employees fabricating tales of employer coer-
cion." 3 If this potential is too great, employers will be discour-
aged from exercising their best judgment regarding those em-
ployees who should or should not be retained. Even though as
a matter of constitutional law the employer's right to dis-
charge at-will employees is no longer absolute, the "em-
ployer's prerogative to make independent, good faith judg-
ments about employees is [nevertheless] important to our free
enterprise system." 4 The legislature has the wherewithal to
define and limit, if it so chooses, the "good cause" require-
111. The court in Cleary stated that when there was evidence showing that the
discharge was for reasons other than valid ones the question as to whether the em-
ployer acted appropriately is one for the jury. 111 Cal. App. 3d at 453, 168 Cal. Rptr.
at 728.
112. Opening Brief for Appellant, Patrick Conboy v. Sears, Roebuck and Co.,
2d Civil No. 61679 1 at 6 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) (reversed jury verdict, new trial re-
sulted in defense verdict).
113. Blades, Employment At Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the




ment to make its consistent and equitable application possi-
ble. If left to the legislature everyone's rights, including the
employer's, would be considered.
VI. CONCLUSION
The at-will doctrine has undergone considerable change.
Through the placement of limitations on the doctrine by use
of contract law, statutory enactments, and public policy con-
siderations the California Legislature and the courts have re-
tracted from the explicit meaning of Labor Code section 2922
and the at-will employment doctrine. In so doing, they have
effectively diminished the employer's right to discharge em-
ployees. The courts, however, have not stopped with these
necessary modifications; with the introduction of the "good
cause" requirement for termination, they have gone one step
further in limiting the at-will doctrine. Through this new ex-
ception to the at-will employment doctrine, the courts effec-
tively prohibit any employer from firing an employee except
for "good cause," regardless of the contractual relationship ex-
isting between them. If accepted as precedent by the Califor-
nia Supreme Court, the at-will employment relationship will
not only be modified by the provisions of Labor Code section
2922 but will be destroyed as well.
In their continued concern for the rights of the employee
the courts have not only overlooked the adequacy of the ex-
isting limitations on the employer's discretion in terminating
an at-will employee, but they have also ignored the employer's
rights. Constitutionally, this new exception should not be up-
held. It interferes with the employment contract by imposing
a "good cause" termination term on the parties without their
consent. It also strips the employer of his due process rights.
The appellate courts, in fashioning this "good cause" excep-
tion, did not have the capacity to weigh and balance all the
alternatives necessary to arrive at a well-reasoned conclusion.
The entire concept behind the at-will employment doc-
trine is "mutuality of obligation." This contractual principle is
based on both parties giving up something in return for re-
ceiving something. With the "good cause" exception, however,
the employer is forced to completely give up his right to dis-
charge at-will, yet the at-will employee is asked to give up
nothing; he is still free to stop rendering his services to the
employer whenever and for whatever reason he chooses. If the
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result were otherwise, the employee's constitutional right not
to be forced against his will into the service of another would
be violated. What the courts have apparently failed to recog-
nize is that this "good cause" exception will result in the em-
ployer's "enslavement" by forcing him to retain, against his
will, the employee's services. The right to life, liberty, and
property provided for by the Due Process Clause of the four-
teenth amendment, however, was not intended to protect
some people and not others; it was intended to protect every-
one, including employers.
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